



*INTERROGATING* **POSTFEMINISM**

Console-ing Passions  
Television and Cultural Power  
Edited by Lynn Spigel

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## CONTENTS

Acknowledgments	vii
Introduction: Feminist Politics and Postfeminist Culture <i>YVONNE TASKER AND DIANE NEGRA</i>	i
1. Postfeminism and Popular Culture: Bridget Jones and the New Gender Regime <i>ANGELA MCROBBIE</i>	27
2. Mass Magazine Cover Girls: Some Reflections on Postfeminist Girls and Postfeminism's Daughters <i>SARAH PROJANSKY</i>	40
3. Living a <i>Charmed</i> Life: The Magic of Postfeminist Sisterhood <i>HANNAH E. SANDERS</i>	71
4. "I Hate My Job, I Hate Everybody Here": Adultery, Boredom, and the "Working Girl" in Twenty-First-Century American Cinema <i>SUZANNE LEONARD</i>	111
5. Remapping the Resonances of Riot Grrrl: Feminisms, Postfeminisms, and "Processes" of Punk <i>ANNA FEIGENBAUM</i>	141
6. Killing Bill: Rethinking Feminism and Film Violence <i>LISA COULTHARD</i>	171

Angela McRobbie

**1** **Postfeminism and Popular Culture**  
*BRIDGET JONES AND THE NEW GENDER REGIME*

**Complexification of Backlash?**

**T**his article presents a series of possible conceptual frames for engaging with what has come to be known as postfeminism. It understands postfeminism to refer to an active process by which feminist gains of the 1970s and 1980s come to be undermined. It proposes that, through an array of machinations, elements of contemporary popular culture are perniciously effective in regard to this undoing of feminism while simultaneously appearing to be engaging in a well-informed and even well-intended response to "feminism." It then proposes that this "undoing," which can be perceived in the broad cultural field, is compounded by some dynamics in sociological theory (including the work of Anthony Giddens and Ulrich Beck) that appear to be most relevant to aspects of gender and social change. Finally, it suggests that by means of the tropes of freedom and choice that are now inextricably connected with the category of "young women," feminism is decisively "aged" and made to seem redundant. Feminism is cast into the shadows, where at best it can expect to have some afterlife, where it might be regarded ambivalently by those young women who

must in more public venues stake a distance from it, for the sake of social and sexual recognition. I propose a complexification, then, of the backlash thesis that gained currency within forms of journalism associated with popular feminism.<sup>1</sup>

The backlash for Susan Faludi was a concerted, conservative response to the achievements of feminism. My argument is that postfeminism positively draws on and invokes feminism as that which can be taken into account, to suggest that equality is achieved, in order to install a whole repertoire of new meanings, which emphasize that it is no longer needed, that it is a spent force. In Britain this was most vividly seen in a newspaper column, "Bridget Jones's Diary," and in the enormously successful book and films that followed.<sup>2</sup> For my purposes here, postfeminism permits the close examination of a number of intersecting but also conflicting currents. It allows us to examine shifts of direction in the feminist academy while also taking into account the seeming repudiation of feminism within this same academic context by those young women who are its unruly (student) subjects. Broadly, I am arguing that for feminism to be "taken into account" it has to be understood as having already passed away. This is a movement detectable across popular culture, a site where "power . . . is remade at various junctures within everyday life, [constituting] our tenuous sense of common sense."<sup>3</sup> Some fleeting comments by Judith Butler suggest to me that postfeminism can be explored through what I would describe as a "double entanglement."<sup>4</sup> This comprises the coexistence of neoconservative values in relation to gender, sexuality, and family life (e.g., George W. Bush supporting the campaign to encourage chastity among young people and in March 2004 declaring that civilization itself depends on traditional marriage) with processes of liberalization in regard to choice and diversity in domestic, sexual, and kinship relations (e.g., gay couples now able to adopt, foster, or have their own children by whatever means and, in the United Kingdom at least, full rights to "civil partnerships"). It also encompasses the existence of feminism as at some level transformed into a form of Gramscian common sense, while also fiercely repudiated, indeed almost hated.<sup>5</sup> The "taken into accountness" permits an all the more thorough dismantling of feminist politics and the discrediting of the occasionally voiced need for its renewal.

### Feminism Dismantling Itself

The impact of this "double entanglement," which is manifest in popular and political culture, coincides, however, with feminism in the academy finding it necessary to dismantle itself. For the sake of periodization, we could say that 1990 (or thereabouts) marks a turning point, the moment of definitive self-critique in feminist theory. At this time, the representational claims of second-wave feminism come to be fully interrogated by postcolonialist feminists such as Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Trinh Thi Minh-ha, and Chandra Talpade Mohanty, among others, and feminist theorists such as Judith Butler and Donna Haraway, who inaugurated the radical denaturalizing of the postfeminist body.<sup>6</sup> Under the prevailing influence of Michel Foucault, there is a shift away from feminist interest in centralized power blocs (e.g., the state, patriarchy, and law) to more dispersed sites, events, and instances of power conceptualized as flows and specific convergences and consolidations of talk, discourse, attentions. The body and also the subject come to represent a focal point for feminist interest, nowhere more so than in the work of Butler. The concept of subjectivity and the means by which cultural forms and interpellations (or dominant social processes) call women into being, produce them as subjects while ostensibly merely describing them as such, inevitably means that it is a problematic "she," rather than an unproblematic "we," that is indicative of a turn to what we might describe as the emerging politics of postfeminist inquiry.<sup>7</sup>

In feminist cultural studies, the early 1990s also marks a moment of feminist reflexivity. In "Pedagogies of the Feminine" Charlotte Brunsdon queried the (hitherto assumed) use value to feminist media scholarship of the binary opposition between femininity and feminism, or as she put it the extent to which the "housewife" or "ordinary woman" was conceived of as the assumed subject of attention for feminism.<sup>8</sup> Looking back we can see how heavily utilized this dualism was and also how particular it was to gender arrangements for largely white and relatively affluent (i.e., housewifely) women. The year 1990 also marked the moment at which the concept of popular feminism found expression. Andrea Stuart considered the wider circulation of feminist values across the landscape of popular culture, in particular magazines in which quite suddenly issues that had been central to the formation of the women's movement, such as domestic violence, equal pay, and workplace ha-

rassment, were now addressed to a vast readership.<sup>9</sup> The wider dissemination of feminist issues was also a key concern in my own writing at this time, in particular the intersection of these new representations with the daily lives of young women who, as subjects (“called into being”) of popular feminism, might then be expected to embody more emboldened (though also of course “failed”) identities. This gave rise to the idea of feminist success. Of course, no sooner is the word *success* written than it is queried. How could this be gauged? What might be the criteria for judging degrees of feminist success?

#### Female Success

Admittedly there is some extravagance in my claim for feminist success. It might be more accurate to remark on the keen interest across the quality and popular media (themselves wishing to increase their female readers and audiences) in ideas of female success. As feminist values are indeed taken on board within a range of institutions, including law, education, to an extent medicine, and likewise employment and the media, high-profile or newsworthy achievements of women and girls in these sectors show the institutions to be modern and abreast with social change. This is the context, then, within which feminism is acknowledged, and this is what I mean by feminism taken into account. Feminist success has, so far, only been described sporadically.<sup>10</sup> Within media and cultural studies, both Brunsdon and myself have each considered how with feminism as part of the academic curriculum (i.e., “canonized”), then it is not surprising that it might also be countered; that is, feminism must face up to the consequences of its own claims to representation and power and not be so surprised when young women students decline the invitation to identify as a “we” with their feminist teachers and scholars.<sup>11</sup> This interface between the feminist academy and the student body has also been discussed in American feminist journals, particularly in regard to the decline of women’s studies.<sup>12</sup> Back in the early 1990s (and following Judith Butler), I saw this sense of contestation on the part of young women, and what I would call their “distance from feminism,” as one of potential where a lively dialogue about how feminism might develop would commence.<sup>13</sup> Indeed, it seemed in the very nature of feminism that it gave rise to disidentification as a kind of requirement for its existence. But, still, it seems now, over a decade later, that this space of “distance from feminism” and those utterances of forceful non-identity with feminism have consolidated into something closer to repudia-

tion than ambivalence, and it is this vehemently denunciatory stance that is manifest across the field of popular gender debate. This is the cultural space of postfeminism.

In this context, it requires both imagination and hopefulness to argue that the active, sustained, and repetitive repudiation or repression of “feminism” also marks its (still fearful) presence or even longevity (as afterlife). What I mean by this is that there are different kinds of repudiation and different investments in such a stance. The more gentle denunciations of feminism (as in the film *Bridget Jones’s Diary*) coexist, however, with the shrill championing of young women as a “metaphor for social change” on the pages of the right-wing press in the United Kingdom, in particular the *Daily Mail*. This anti-feminist endorsement of female individualization is embodied in the figure of the ambitious “tv blonde.”<sup>14</sup> These so-called “A1” girls are glamorous high achievers destined for Oxford or Cambridge and are usually pictured clutching A-level examination certificates. We might say these are ideal girls, subjects par excellence, and also subjects of excellence. Nor are these notions of female success exclusive to the changing representations of young women in the countries of the affluent West. As Spivak has argued, in the impoverished zones of the world, governments and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) also look to the minds and bodies of young women, for whom education comes to promise enormous economic and demographic rewards.<sup>15</sup> Young women are a good investment, they can be trusted with microcredit, they are the privileged subjects of social change. But the terms of these great expectations on the part of governments are that young women must do without more autonomous feminist politics. What is consistent is the displacement of feminism as a political movement. It is this displacement that is reflected in Judith Butler’s sorrowful account of Antigone’s life after death. Her shadowy, lonely existence suggests a modality of feminist effectivity as spectral; she has to be cast out, indeed entombed, for social organization to once again become intelligible.

#### Unpopular Feminism

The media have become the key site for defining codes of sexual conduct. They cast judgment and establish the rules of play. Across these many channels of communication, feminism is routinely disparaged. Why is feminism so hated? Why do young women recoil in horror at the very idea of the femi-

nist? To count as a girl today appears to require this kind of ritualistic denunciation, which in turn suggests that one strategy in the disempowering of feminism includes it being historicized and generationalized and thus easily rendered out of date. It would be far too simplistic to trace a pattern in media from popular feminism (or "prime-time feminism," including that found in such TV programs as *LA Law*) in the early 1990s to niche feminism (BBC Radio 4's *Woman's Hour* and the Women's Page of the *Guardian* newspaper) in the mid-1990s and then to overtly unpopular feminism (in the new century), as though these charted a chronological "great moving right show," as Stuart Hall once put it in another context.<sup>16</sup> We would need a more developed conceptual schema to account for the simultaneous feminization of popular media with this accumulation of ambivalent, fearful responses. We would certainly need to signal the full enfranchisement of women in the West, of all ages, as audiences, active consumers of media and the many products they promote, and, by virtue of education, earning power and consumer identity a sizable block of target market. We would also need to be able to theorize female achievement predicated not on feminism but on "female individualism," on success that seems to be based on the invitation to young women by various governments that they might now consider themselves free to compete in education and work as privileged subjects of the "new meritocracy." Is this, then, the New Deal for New Labour's "modern" young women: female individualization and the new meritocracy at the expense of feminist politics?

There are various sites within popular culture where this work of undoing feminism with some subtlety becomes visible.<sup>17</sup> An advertisement showing the model Eva Herzigova looking down admiringly at her substantial cleavage enhanced by the lacy pyrotechnics of the Wonderbra was throughout the mid-1990s positioned in major high-street locations in the United Kingdom on full-size billboards. The composition of the image had such a textbook "sexist ad" dimension that one could be forgiven for supposing some ironic familiarity both with cultural studies and with feminist critiques of advertising.<sup>18</sup> It was, in a sense, taking feminism into account by showing it to be a thing of the past, by provocatively "enacting sexism" while at the same time playing with those debates in film theory about women as the object of the gaze and even with female desire.<sup>19</sup> The picture is in noirish black and white and refers explicitly through its captions (from "Hello Boys" to "Or

Are You Just Pleased to See Me?") to Hollywood and the famous lines of the actress Mae West. Here is an advertisement that plays back to its viewers well-known aspects of feminist media studies, film theory, and semiotics. Indeed, it almost offers (albeit crudely) the viewer or passing driver Laura Mulvey's theory of women as objects of the gaze projected as cityscape within the frame of the billboard. Also mobilized in this ad is the familiarity of the term *political correctness*, the efficacy of which resides in its warranting and unleashing such energetic reactions against the seemingly tyrannical regime of feminist puritanism. Everyone, and especially young people, can give a sigh of relief. Thank goodness, the ad seems to suggest, it is permissible, once again, to enjoy looking at the bodies of beautiful women. At the same time, the advertisement also hopes to provoke feminist condemnation as a means of generating publicity. Thus, generational differences are also produced; the younger female viewer, along with her male counterparts, educated in irony and visually literate, is not made angry by such a repertoire. She appreciates its layers of meaning; she "gets the joke."

When in a TV advertisement (1998-99) another supermodel, Claudia Schiffer, takes off her clothes as she descends a flight of stairs in a luxury mansion on her way out of the door toward her new Citroën car, a similar rhetoric is at work. This ad appears to suggest that, yes, this is a self-consciously "sexist ad." Feminist critiques of it are deliberately evoked. Feminism is "taken into account" but only to be shown to be no longer necessary. Why? Because it now seems that there is no exploitation here; there is nothing remotely naive about this striptease. She seems to be doing it out of choice and for her own enjoyment. The ad works on the basis of its audience knowing Claudia to be one of the world's most famous and highly paid supermodels. Once again the shadow of disapproval is evoked (the striptease as a site of female exploitation) only instantly to be dismissed as belonging to the past, to a time when feminists used to object to such imagery. To make such an objection nowadays would run the risk of ridicule. Objection is preempted with irony. In each of these cases, a specter of feminism is invoked so that it might be undone. For male viewers, tradition is restored, or, as Beck puts it, there is "constructed certitude," while for the girls what is proposed is a movement beyond feminism to a more comfortable zone where women are now free to choose for themselves.<sup>20</sup>

### Feminism Undone?

If we turn attention to some of the participatory dynamics in leisure and everyday life that see young women endorse (or else refuse to condemn) the ironic normalization of pornography, where they indicate their approval of and desire to be "pinup girls" for the centerfolds of the soft-porn "lad mags," where it is not at all unusual to pass young women in the street wearing T-shirts bearing phrases such as "Porn Queen" or "Pay to Touch" across the breasts, and where, in the United Kingdom at least, young women quite happily attend lap-dancing clubs (perhaps as a test of their sophistication and "cool"), we are witness to a hyperculture of commercial sexuality, one aspect of which is the repudiation of a feminism invoked only to be summarily dismissed.<sup>21</sup> As a mark of a postfeminist identity, young women journalists refuse to condemn the enormous growth of lap-dancing clubs. They know of the existence of the feminist critiques and debates (or at least this is my claim) through their education; as Shelley Budgeon has described the girls in her study, they are gender aware.<sup>22</sup> Thus, the new female subject is, despite her freedom, called upon to be silent, to withhold critique in order to count as a modern, sophisticated girl. Indeed, this withholding of critique is a condition of her freedom. There is quietude and complicity in the manners of generationally specific notions of cool and, more precisely, an uncritical relation to dominant, commercially produced, sexual representations that actively invoke hostility to assumed feminist positions from the past in order to endorse a new regime of sexual meanings based on female consent, equality, participation, and pleasure, free of politics.<sup>23</sup>

### Female Individualization

By using the term *female individualization* I am explicitly drawing on the concept of individualization that is discussed at length by sociologists, including Anthony Giddens, Ulrich Beck, Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim, as well as Zygmunt Bauman.<sup>24</sup> This work is to be distinguished from the more directly Foucauldian version found in the work of Nikolas Rose.<sup>25</sup> Although there is some shared ground between these authors, insofar as they all reflect on the expectations that individuals now avidly "self-monitor" and that there appears to be greater capacity on the part of individuals to plan "a life of one's own," there are also divergences. Beck and Giddens are less concerned

with the effectivity of power in this new friendly guise as "personal adviser" and instead emphasize the enlargement of freedom and choice, while in contrast Rose sees these modes of self-government as marking out "the shaping of being" and thus the "inculcation of a form of life." Bauman bewails the sheer unviability of naked individualization as the resources of sociality (and welfare) are stripped away, leaving the individual to self-blame when success eludes him or her. (It is also possible to draw a political line between these authors, with Bauman and Rose to the left and Giddens and Beck "beyond left and right.")<sup>26</sup> My emphasis here is on the work of Giddens and Beck, for the very reason that it appears to speak directly to the postfeminist generation. In their writing, there are only distant echoes (if that) of the feminist struggles that were required to produce the newfound freedoms of young women in the West. There is little trace of the battles fought, of the power struggles embarked upon, or of the enduring inequities that still mark out the relations between men and women. All of this is airbrushed out of existence on the basis that, as they claim, "emancipatory politics" has given way instead to life politics (or, in Beck's terms, the subpolitics of single-interest groups). Both of these authors provide a sociological account of the dynamics of social change understood as "reflexive modernization." The earlier period of modernization ("first modernity") created a welfare state and a set of institutions (e.g., education) that allowed people in the "second modernity" to become more independent and able, for example, to earn their own livings. Young women are as a result now "disembedded" from communities where gender roles were fixed. And, as the old structures of social class fade away and lose their grip in the context of "late" or second modernity, individuals are increasingly called upon to invent their own structures. They must do this internally and individualistically, so that self-monitoring practices (the diary, the life plan, the career pathway) replace reliance on set ways and structured pathways. Self-help guides, personal advisers, lifestyle coaches and gurus, and all sorts of self-improvement TV programs provide the cultural means by which individualization operates as a social process. As the overwhelming force of structure fades, so also, it is claimed, does the capacity for agency increase.

Individuals must now choose the kind of life they want to live. Girls must have a life plan. They must become more reflexive in regard to every aspect of their lives, from making the right choice in marriage to taking responsibility for their own working lives and not being dependent on a job for life or on

the stable and reliable operations of a large-scale bureaucracy, which in the past would have allocated its employees specific, and possibly unchanging, roles. Beck and Giddens each place a different inflection on their accounts of reflexive modernization, and these arguments appear to fit very directly with the kinds of scenarios and dilemmas facing the young women characters in the narratives of contemporary popular culture (especially so-called chick lit). There is also a real evasion in this writing of the ongoing existence of deep and pernicious gender inequities (most manifest for older women of all social backgrounds but also for young black or Asian women and also for young working-class women). Beck and Giddens are quite inattentive to the regulative dimensions of the popular discourses of personal choice and self-improvement. Choice is surely, within lifestyle culture, a modality of constraint. The individual is compelled to be the kind of subject who can make the right choices. By these means, new lines and demarcations are drawn between those subjects who are judged responsive to the regime of personal responsibility and those who fail miserably. Neither Giddens nor Beck mount a substantial critique of these power relations, which work so effectively at the level of embodiment. They have no grasp that these are productive of new realms of injury and injustice.

#### Bridget Jones

The film *Bridget Jones's Diary* (an international box office success) draws together so many of these sociological themes it could almost have been scripted by Anthony Giddens himself. Aged thirty, living and working in London, Bridget (played by Renée Zellweger) is a free agent, single and childless and able to enjoy herself in pubs, bars, and restaurants. She is the product of modernity in that she has benefited from those institutions (education) that have loosened the ties of tradition and community for women, making it possible for them to be "disembedded" and to relocate to the city to earn an independent living without shame or danger. However, this also gives rise to new anxieties. There is the fear of loneliness for example, the stigma of remaining single, and the risks and uncertainties of not finding the right partner to be a father to children as well as a husband. In the film, the opening sequence shows Bridget in her pajamas worrying about being alone and on the shelf. The soundtrack is "All by Myself" by Jamie O'Neal, and the audience laughs along with her in this moment of self-doubt. We



In *Bridget Jones's Diary*, Bridget (Renée Zellweger) embodies an enthusiastic embrace of her own sexual commodification. Here her costume suggests a knowing, even ironic, consent to a contemporary culture of commercial sexuality.

immediately know that what she is thinking is, "What will it be like if I never find the right man, if I never get married?" Bridget portrays the whole spectrum of attributes associated with the self-monitoring subject: she confides in her friends; she keeps a diary; she endlessly reflects on her fluctuating weight, noting her calorie intake; she plans, plots, and has projects. She is also deeply uncertain as to what the future holds for her. Despite the choices she has, there are also any number of risks, of which she is regularly reminded, the risk that she might let the right man slip from under her nose (hence she must always be on the lookout), the risk that not catching a man at the right time might mean she misses the chance of having children (her biological clock is ticking); there is also the risk that, partnerless, she will be isolated, marginalized from the world of happy couples. Now there is only the self to blame if the right partner is not found.

With the burden of self-management so apparent, Bridget fantasizes about very traditional forms of happiness and fulfilment. After a flirtatious encounter with her boss (played by Hugh Grant), she imagines herself in a white wedding dress surrounded by bridesmaids, and the audience laughs loudly because they, like Bridget, know that this is not how young women these days are meant to think. Feminism has intervened to constrain these kinds of conventional desires. It is, then, a relief to escape this censorious politics and freely enjoy that which has been disapproved of. Thus, feminism is only invoked in order to be relegated to the past. But this is not simply a return to the past; there are, of course, quite dramatic differences between



the various female characters of current popular culture from Bridget Jones to the "girls" in *Sex and the City* and to Ally McBeal, and those found in girls' and women's magazines from a prefeminist era. The new young women are confident enough to declare their anxieties about possible failure in regard to finding a husband, they avoid any aggressive or overtly traditional men, and they brazenly enjoy their sexuality without fear of the sexual double standard. In addition, they are more than capable of earning their own living, and the degree of suffering or shame they anticipate in the absence of finding a husband is countered by sexual self-confidence. Being without a husband does not mean they will go without men.

With such light entertainment as this, suffused with irony and dedicated to reinventing highly successful women's genres of film and tv, an argument about feminism being so repudiated might seem heavy-handed. These are hardly rabid antifeminist tracts. But relations of power are indeed made and remade within texts of enjoyment and rituals of relaxation and abandonment. These young women's genres are vital to the construction of a new "gender regime" based on the double-entanglement that I have described. They endorse wholeheartedly what Nicholas Rose calls "this ethic of freedom," and young women have come to the fore as the preeminent subjects of this new ethic. These popular texts normalize postfeminist gender anxieties so as to regulate young women by means of the language of personal choice. But even "well-regulated liberty" can backfire (the source of comic effect), and this in turn gives rise to demarcated pathologies (leaving it too late to have a baby, failing to find a good catch, etc.) that carefully define the parameters of what constitutes livable lives for young women without the occasion of reinvented feminism.

#### Notes

This essay was originally published as "Post-feminism and Popular Culture" in *Feminist Media Studies*.

1. Faludi, *Backlash*.
2. "Bridget Jones's Diary" appeared first as a weekly column in the *Independent* in 1996; its author, Helen Fielding, then published the diaries in book form. The film *Bridget Jones's Diary*, directed by Sharon McGuire, opened in 2001. The sequel, *Bridget Jones: The Edge of Reason*, directed by Beeban Kidron, opened in November 2004.
3. Butler, Laclau, and Žižek, *Contingency, Hegemony, and Universality*, 14.
4. Butler, *Antigone's Claim*.
5. McRobbie, "Mothers and Fathers, Who Needs Them?"

6. Spivak, *A Critique of Postcolonial Reason*; Trinh, *Women Native Other*; Mohanty, "Under Western Eyes"; Butler, *Gender Trouble*; Haraway, *Simians, Cyborgs, and Women*.
7. Butler, *Gender Trouble*; *Bodies That Matter*.
8. Brunson, "Pedagogies of the Feminine."
9. Stuart, "Feminism."
10. For accounts of girls' achievement in education, see Arnot, David, and Weiner, *Closing the Gender Gap*; and Harris, *Future Girl*.
11. Brunson, *Screen Tastes*; McRobbie, *In the Culture Society*.
12. Brown "The Impossibility of Women's Studies."
13. Butler, "Contingent Foundations"; McRobbie, *Postmodernism and Popular Culture*.
14. McRobbie, "Feminism v. the tv Blondes." The *Daily Mail* has the highest volume of female readers of all daily newspapers in the United Kingdom. Its most frequent efforts in regard to promoting a postfeminist sensibility involve commissioning well-known former feminists to recant and blame feminism for contemporary ills among women. For example, the issue of 23 August 2003 featured Fay Weldon in "Look What We've Done." A caption reads, "For years feminists campaigned for sexual liberation. But here, one of their leaders admits all they have created is a new generation of women for whom sex is utterly joyless and hollow."
15. Spivak, *A Critique of Postcolonial Reason*.
16. Hall, *The Hard Road to Renewal*.
17. Brunson, "Feminism, Postfeminism."
18. Williamson, *Decoding Advertisements*.
19. Mulvey, "Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema"; de Lauretis, *Technologies of Gender*.
20. Beck, *Risk Society*.
21. See Gill, "From Sexual Objectification to Sexual Subjectification."
22. Budgeon, "Emergent Feminist Identities."
23. By the normalization of porn, or "ironic pornography," I am referring to the new popular mainstreaming of what in the past would have been soft-core pornography out of reach of the young on the "top shelf." In a post-AIDS era, with sexual frankness an imperative for prevention, the commercial British youth media now produce vast quantities of explicit sexual material for the teenage audience; in recent years, and as a strategy for being ahead of the competition, this has been incorporated into the language of "cool." With irony as a trademark of knowingness, sexual cool entails "being up for it" without revealing any misgivings, never mind criticism, on the basis of the distance entailed in the ironic experience.
24. Giddens, *Modernity and Self-Identity*; Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, *Individualisation*; Bauman, *Liquid Modernity*; Bauman, *The Individualised Society*.
25. Rose, *Powers of Freedom*.
26. Giddens, *The Third Way*. Anthony Giddens is the architect of the Third Way politics that was embraced by New Labour in its first term of office, and this writing drew on an earlier work, *Beyond Left and Right*. Likewise, Ulrich Beck was connected with the Neue Mitte in Germany, though the German "Third Way" had rather less success than its British counterpart.